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PROBLEMS WITH CENSORSHIP
John Villasenor*
ABSTRACT— To what extent could an abortion-restrictive state impede
access to online information about abortion? After Dobbs, this question is no
longer theoretical. This essay engages with this issue from both a legal and
technological perspective, analyzing First Amendment jurisprudence as well
as the technological implications of state-level online censorship. It
concludes that the weight of Supreme Court precedent indicates that state
attempts to censor information regarding out-of-state abortion services
would violate the First Amendment. That said, the essay also recognizes that
as Dobbs itself upended precedent, it is unclear what Supreme Court would
do when ruling on questions regarding the extent of state power to limit
access to information in this domain. The essay also considers the
technological implications of state efforts to censor online access to
information about abortion, concluding that these efforts would be mostly,
though not completely, unsuccessful.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization,1 decided in June 2022,
returned to states the authority to regulate access to abortion. This Essay
addresses two of the many questions created by Dobbs and its aftermath:
Should the free speech clause of the First Amendment prevent legislators in
an abortion-restrictive state from impeding access to, and provision of,
online information about abortion services available in abortion-permissive
states?2 And is such censorship even technologically feasible?
The answer to the first question is “yes,” internet censorship in this
manner would contravene the First Amendment.3 But it will nonetheless be
attempted, as demonstrated, for example, by a bill introduced in the South
Carolina legislature in June 2022.4 This Essay therefore aims to engage with
some of the key case law and arguments that will likely be presented in the
resulting court challenges. It concludes that the weight of Supreme Court
precedent indicates that state attempts to impede access to abortion
information from out-of-state web sites would violate the First Amendment.
The Essay also explores the technological feasibility of state internet
censorship attempts—an issue that is relevant because the legal process to
challenge them will take time, and because the Supreme Court may not feel
obligated to follow precedent in future First Amendment cases arising as a
consequence of Dobbs. It explains why, given the availability of multiple
workarounds, state attempts to block online access to information about outof-state abortion services would be largely, but not completely, unsuccessful.
For a First Amendment court challenge over online interstate access to
abortion services information to occur, there are two prerequisites: State-tostate variations in laws regarding the circumstances under which abortion is
permitted, and state laws that aim to impede access to information about out1

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022).
This Essay uses “abortion-restrictive” to refer to states that have, or will soon have, laws prohibiting
most or all abortions, and “abortion-permissive” to refer to states that do not have such laws. For the
purposes of this Essay, it is not necessary to identify where the boundary lies between “permissive” and
“restrictive.” What matters is that there are state-to-state variations in abortion laws, thereby opening the
door to the First Amendment questions explored herein.
3
While this Essay focuses on free expression, that is not the only First Amendment freedom
implicated by state-imposed internet censorship. For example, attempts to limit what online news sites
could publish regarding abortion would implicate freedom of the press.
4
The South Carolina bill would criminalize “hosting or maintaining an internet website, providing
access to an internet website, or providing an internet service purposefully directed to a pregnant woman
who is a resident of this State that provides information on how to obtain an abortion, knowing that the
information will be used, or is reasonably likely to be used for an abortion.” S. 1373, Gen. Assemb., 124th
Sess. (S.C. 2022). While the bill has a clause providing that it “may not be construed to impose liability
or conduct protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or by South Carolina
Constitution,” this does little to mitigate the First Amendment concerns raised by the bill.
2
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of-state abortion services. State variations in abortion laws were already in
place prior to Dobbs, and are increasing as more state legislatures respond to
the post-Dobbs landscape. The second prerequisite could arise either through
a) broadly worded antiabortion statutes that do not specifically mention
impeding online access to abortion services information but might
nonetheless be applied to that end, or b) through statutes that explicitly target
access to such information.
For an example of laws pre-dating Dobbs that might be applied to
impede online access to information, consider the “bounty” laws enacted in
Texas5 in late 2021 and in Oklahoma6 in May 2022 that create a cause of civil
action against “any person . . . who . . . knowingly engages in conduct that
aids or abets the performance or inducement of an abortion.”7 The laws in
both states provide that if the claimant prevails, the court must award
statutory damages of at least $10,000 for each abortion “that the defendant
aided or abetted.”8 Does operating a website aimed at providing information
regarding out-of-state abortion services to people in states with bounty laws
constitute aiding or abetting? 9 A plaintiff might assert that it does. The fact
that such an assertion would be constitutionally 10 (and jurisdictionally 11 )
suspect would not negate a defendant’s need to contest it.12
State legislatures are being asked to consider new criminal laws that
would explicitly target the online provision of abortion-related information.
In June 2022, the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) released model
legislation that would criminalize knowingly or intentionally hosting or
maintaining an internet website, providing access to an internet website, or
providing an internet service, purposefully directed to a pregnant woman
who is a resident of this state, that provides information on how to obtain an
5

TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.201–12 (West 2021).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 1-745.3–40 (2022).
7
HEALTH & SAFETY § 171.208(a)(2); tit. 63 § 1-745.35.
8
HEALTH & SAFETY § 171.208(b)(2); tit. 63 § 1-745.35.
9
Also potentially relevant here is a July 2022 decision from the Tenth Circuit (which includes
Oklahoma) contrasting “aiding” or “abetting” on the one hand with the potentially (depending on the
statutory language and context) broader “encouraging” or “inducing” on the other. See United States v.
Hernandez-Calvillo, 39 F.4th 1297, 1303–09 (10th Cir. 2022).
10
Both the Texas and Oklahoma statutes contain language stating that there is no liability created by
speech protected under the First Amendment. See HEALTH & SAFETY § 171.208(b)(2); tit. 63 § 1-745.35.
However, that statutory language will accomplish little in disputes where a central question is whether
speech that allegedly aids or abets an abortion is protected under the First Amendment.
11
In addition to the First Amendment question, such an assertion would raise important jurisdictional
issues. While this Essay briefly comments on some of those issues, it is primarily focused on the First
Amendment question.
12
The use of private law to undermine First Amendment rights would raise a number of issues. See,
e.g., Aziz Huq, The Private Suppression of Constitutional Rights, 101 TEX. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2023),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4072800 [https://perma.cc/7WKF-VTDP].
6
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illegal abortion, knowing that the information will be used, or is reasonably
likely to be used, for an illegal abortions.13
This language is clearly problematic from a First Amendment
standpoint, but it could still make its way into a state law, thereby setting the
stage for a court challenge. Notably, in the days immediately following the
Dobbs decision, legislators in South Carolina introduced a bill titled the
“Equal Protection at Conception – No Exceptions – Act” that contains
language nearly identical to the above-cited excerpt from the NRLC model
legislation.14
These developments make it clear that in addition to enacting and
enforcing laws prohibiting physicians from performing abortions, some
abortion-restrictive states will attempt to limit the online flow of information
about abortion services. In exploring the resulting First Amendment and
technological questions, the remainder of this Essay proceeds as follows:
Part II reviews some key Supreme Court free expression precedents. In light
of those precedents, it presents arguments that proponents and opponents of
state attempts to impede interstate access to abortion information will likely
make. Part III explores the technological and logistical issues that would
accompany state attempts to censor access to information about abortion
services. As explained in that section, even if abortion-restrictive states had
the legal authority (which, due to the First Amendment, they should not) to
restrict access to out-of-state websites providing abortion information, as a
technological matter these censorship attempts would be largely though not
completely ineffective. Conclusions are offered in Part IV.
II. CONSIDERING THE ARGUMENTS
While the Supreme Court’s free expression jurisprudence is
voluminous,15 there are a handful of cases that are particularly relevant to the
question at issue in this Essay. This section reviews some of those cases and
then considers how they are likely to be invoked. It also briefly considers
13
Bopp Law Firm, NRLC Post-Roe Model Abortion Law, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE COMM. 1, 13 (June
15, 2022), https://www.nrlc.org/wp-content/uploads/NRLC-Post-Roe-Model-Abortion-Law-FINAL1.pdf [https://perma.cc/VRX8-4VTJ].
14
S. 1373, Gen. Assemb., 124th Sess. (S.C. 2022). The South Carolina bill was introduced on June
28, 2022, four days after the Supreme Court ruled on Dobbs. The language addressing “hosting or
maintaining an internet website” closely tracks the language in the NRLC model legislation. Id. The bill
also has a clause providing that it “may not be construed to impose liability or conduct protected by the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution or by South Carolina Constitution,” though this does
little to mitigate the First Amendment concerns raised by the “hosting or maintaining” language.
15
See, e.g., the list of cases in the First Amendment Encyclopedia provided by the Free Speech
Center at Middle Tennessee State University, All Cases, THE FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYC.
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/encyclopedia/case-all [https://perma.cc/NY4S-VTC2]. Many of
the hundreds of cases listed are Supreme Court decisions addressing free speech. Id.

90

20:87 (2022)

The First Amendment and Online Access to Information

how attempts to limit the interstate exchange of online information would
implicate the dormant Commerce Clause.
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
1. Bigelow v. Virginia
Bigelow v. Virginia, 16 decided in 1975, addressed attempts by an
abortion-restrictive state to block access to information about abortion
services available in an abortion-permissive state. After the Virginia Weekly
published an advertisement in early 1971 for abortion services available in
New York, managing editor Jeffrey C. Bigelow was charged with violating
a Virginia statute that outlawed the “sale or circulation of any publication”
that would “encourage or prompt the procuring of abortion.” 17 He was
convicted in a county court, and his conviction was subsequently upheld by
the Virginia Supreme Court. 18 After Roe v. Wade in 1973, the Virginia
Supreme Court then considered the case a second time and reaffirmed
Bigelow’s conviction.19
In 1975, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed Bigelow’s conviction,
writing “[w]e conclude that Virginia could not apply [the statute at
issue] . . . to appellant’s publication of the advertisement in question without
unconstitutionally infringing upon his First Amendment rights.” 20 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court considered whether the commercial
nature of the speech in question meant that it was unprotected by the First
Amendment. The Court answered this question in the negative, writing “the
fact that the particular advertisement in [Bigelow’s] newspaper had
commercial aspects or reflected the advertiser’s commercial interests did not
negate all First Amendment guarantees.”21 This foreshadowed the Court’s
holding a year later in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc. that “commercial speech, like other varieties, is
protected.”22

16

Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
Id. at 811–13.
18
Id. at 813–14.
19
Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 200 S.E.2d 680 (Va. 1973). In reaffirming the conviction, the Virginia
Supreme Court wrote the intervening U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence which included not only Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), but also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), did not address abortion
advertising, and therefore that its earlier conclusion that “government regulation of commercial
advertising in the medical-health field was not prohibited by the First Amendment,” Bigelow, 200 S.E.2d
at 342, was not affected.
20
Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 829.
21
Id. at 818.
22
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
17
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The Bigelow Court also noted that the advertisement contained phrases
such as “Abortions are now legal in New York” 23 and thus conveyed
information “not only to readers possibly in need of the services offered, but
also to those with a general curiosity about, or genuine interest in, the subject
matter or the law of another State.”24 The Court concluded that a state “may
not, under the guise of exercising internal police powers, bar a citizen of
another State from disseminating information about an activity that is legal
in that State.”25
A comparison of the preceding two quotations shows that the Bigelow
Court recognized the interests of both speakers in New York wishing to
convey information and listeners in Virginia with a “genuine interest in” that
information. 26 The Court’s rebuke is directed at Virginia’s attempt to
interfere with the First Amendment rights of New York speakers as well at
Virginia’s attempt to interfere with the First Amendment rights of Virginia
listeners.
2. United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.
Proponents of the constitutionality of restrictions on interstate provision
of information on abortion access will point to United States v. Edge
Broadcasting Co., decided in 1993. 27 At that time, Virginia had a statesponsored lottery but North Carolina did not.28 Edge Broadcasting owned a
radio station that broadcast from a transmitter located in North Carolina
about three miles from the Virginia border and reached an audience whose
members were mostly in Virginia.29
Federal law at the time (and today) provided that it was, subject to
certain exceptions, unlawful to broadcast “by means of any radio or
television station for which a license is required by any law of the United
States . . . any advertisement of or information concerning any lottery.”30 The
law, 18 U.S.C. § 1304, did not apply to broadcasts by stations licensed to

23

Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 812.
Id. at 822.
25
Id. at 824–25. While the core holding of Bigelow related to the First Amendment, in dicta the Court
also addressed the issue of travel, noting that Virginia could not “prevent its residents from traveling to
New York to obtain [abortion] services or . . . prosecute them for going there.” Id. at 824 (internal citation
omitted).
26
Id. at 822.
27
United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
28
Id. at 423.
29
Id. The Court wrote that “[a]lthough Edge was licensed to serve the Elizabeth City area, it chose
to broadcast from a more northerly position, which allowed its signal to reach into the Hampton Roads,
Virginia, metropolitan area.” Id. at 429.
30
18 U.S.C. § 1304.
24
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locations in states that have lotteries.31 Edge Broadcasting did not benefit
from this exception, as it was located in a state without a lottery.
Edge Broadcasting filed a claim in a Virginia federal district court
seeking a declaratory judgement that 18 U.S.C. § 1304 was
unconstitutional.32 In assessing the claim, the district court applied the fourfactor Central Hudson test, 33 which is used to evaluate whether a law
burdening commercial speech violates the First Amendment. The district
court concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 1304 did not satisfy the Central Hudson
factor requiring that it directly advance the asserted government interest and
was thus unconstitutional.34
After the Fourth Circuit affirmed,35 the Supreme Court reversed, writing
that “the statutes challenged here regulate commercial speech in a manner
that does not violate the First Amendment.”36 The Court rejected the lower
courts’ conclusions regarding government interest under Central Hudson,
writing “[w]e have no doubt that the statutes directly advanced the
governmental interest at stake in this case.”37 The Court then explained that
18 U.S.C. §1304 reflected Congress’ goal of supporting each state’s
regulatory approach with respect to lotteries:
Instead of favoring either the lottery or the nonlottery State, Congress
opted to support the antigambling policy of a State like North Carolina by
forbidding stations in such a State to air lottery advertising. At the same time
it sought not to unduly interfere with the policy of a lottery-sponsoring State
such as Virginia. Virginia could advertise its lottery through radio and
television stations licensed to Virginia locations, even if their signals reached
deep into North Carolina.38

31

See 18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(1)(B), stating that the provisions of § 1304 do not apply to “broadcast by
a radio or television station licensed to a location in that State or a State which conducts such a lottery.”
32
Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 424.
33
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). The
Court articulated the test as follows: “At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected
by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern
lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is
substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.” Id. at 566.
34
Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 425.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 436.
37
Id. at 428.
38
Id.

93

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

3. Reno v. ACLU
Reno v. ACLU39 was decided in 1996 and arose from a challenge to two
provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 40 (CDA) that
respectively addressed communications of “obscene or indecent” and
“patently offensive” content.41 Congress enacted the CDA in response to the
rapid growth of the internet, 42 and with it concerns among legislators
regarding the increasing availability of online content inappropriate for
minors.43 The Court found both of the statutes at issue to be unconstitutional,
explaining that “the CDA lacks the precision that the First Amendment
requires when a statute regulates the content of speech,” and that “[i]n order
to deny minors access to potentially harmful speech, the CDA effectively
suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to
receive and to address to one another.”44
More fundamentally, the Reno Court specifically distinguished the
internet from traditional over-the-air broadcasting, observing that “unlike the
conditions that prevailed when Congress first authorized regulation of the
broadcast spectrum, the Internet can hardly be considered a ‘scarce’
expressive commodity. It provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity
for communication of all kinds.”45 The Court recognized that the scarcity that
had been used as the basis to justify lower First Amendment protections in
broadcasting did not apply to the internet, writing that “our cases provide no
basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be
applied to this medium.”46

39

Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
Id. at 859. The Communications Decency Act was Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 133 (1996).
41
Reno, 521 U.S. at 859. One of the challenged provisions was codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) and
criminalized transmitting “obscene or indecent” interstate or foreign communications to an underage
person. Id. The second challenged provision was codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) and criminalized using
an “interactive computer service” in interstate or foreign communications to send “patently offensive”
content to an underage person, or to display such content in a manner available to an underage person. Id.
at 859–60.
42
Id. at 850.
43
Id. at 856.
44
Id. at 874.
45
Id. at 870.
46
Id. The Reno Court also noted what it viewed as an additional difference between the internet and
traditional broadcast media, writing “the Internet is not as ‘invasive’ as radio or television. The District
Court specifically found that ‘[c]ommunications over the Internet do not invade an individual’s home or
appear on one’s computer screen unbidden. Users seldom encounter content “by accident.’” Id. at 869
(citing Am. C.L. Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)).
40
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4. McCullen v. Coakley
McCullen v. Coakley,47 decided in 2014, considered a Massachusetts
law that made it unlawful, with some exceptions, to “knowingly enter or
remain on a public way or sidewalk adjacent to a reproductive health care
facility within a radius of 35 feet of any portion of an entrance, exit or
driveway of a reproductive health care facility.”48 The Supreme Court struck
down the law on First Amendment grounds, writing that Massachusetts has
taken “extreme step of closing a substantial portion of a traditional public
forum to all speakers” and that the “Commonwealth may not do that
consistent with the First Amendment.”49 Notably, the Court had reached the
opposite conclusion in Hill v. Colorado50 in 2000 in relation to a similar law,
and while McCullen acknowledged Hill v. Colorado, it stopped short of
explicitly overturning it.51
5. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.
While the Supreme Court decisions discussed above relate to the
internet, abortion, and to communications involving activities that are lawful
in one state but not in another, there is also an additional category of relevant
cases: those addressing the breadth of the First Amendment exception for
speech integral to criminal conduct. In 1949 in Giboney v. Empire Storage
& Ice Co., the Court considered the constitutionality of an injunction issued
to prevent “union members from peaceful picketing” 52 the premises of
Empire Storage and Ice Company, a wholesale ice distributor that refused to
agree not to sell to non-union vendors.53
A Missouri statute at the time made it unlawful to “participate in any
pool, trust, agreement, combination, confederation or understanding with
any person or persons in restraint of trade or competition in the importation,
transportation, manufacture, purchase or sale of any product or commodity
in this state.”54 Empire’s options included continuing to sell to non-union
vendors at the cost of seeing its business reduced by 85% due to the picketing,
or ceasing its sales to non-union vendors, thereby violating the Missouri
47

McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014).
Id. at 471.
49
Id. at 497.
50
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 734–35 (2000).
51
As one commentator noted, “[t]he question is whether the reasons the majority gives [in McCullen]
would effectively render buffer zones like Colorado’s unconstitutional, despite the result in Hill. There’s
a good argument that they would.” Kevin Russell, What is Left of Hill v. Colorado?, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun.
26,
2014,
4:34
PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/what-is-left-of-hill-v-colorado/
[https://perma.cc/DB9L-KK4E].
52
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 491 (1949).
53
Id. at 492.
54
Id. at 491 n.1.
48

95

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

statute. 55 Empire instead pursued legal relief, seeking and obtaining an
injunction against the picketers.56
In rejecting the contention that the injunction violated the First
Amendment, the Court found that the picketing was part of a collection of
activities that “constituted a single and integrated course of conduct, which
was in violation of Missouri’s valid law.”57 The Court held that “it has never
been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course
of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced,
or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.”58
In a 2016 article, Volokh described Giboney as the “leading case cited
as support for [the speech integral to criminal conduct] exception,”59 and
noted that it “hadn’t been cited by the Court at all from 1991 to 2005,”60 and
then was cited multiple times by the Court starting in 2006.61 In addition to
the six post-2005 decisions citing Giboney noted by Volokh, there have since
been several others. 62 This resurgence signals the Court’s interest in the
speech integral to criminal conduct exception—a point that is directly
relevant to this Essay because of how it might apply to the online provision
of information regarding abortion to people in states where abortion is
unlawful.
B. Applying the Precedents
The application of the foregoing precedents depends in part on the
location of the website providing the information at issue. Before proceeding
further, it is important to flag the complexities that arise when referring to
the “location” of a website.
1. Website “Location”
As used herein, the location of a website is deemed to be the place
where the organization that runs it is located. For instance, if a New Yorkbased abortion rights advocacy group creates and maintains a website that
provides abortion services information, that website can be considered to be

55

Id. at 493.
Id. at 494.
57
Id. at 498.
58
Id. at 502.
59
Eugene Volokh, The”Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct” Exception, 101 CORNELL L. REV.
981, 983 (2016); see also Leslie Kendrick, Note, A Test for Criminally Instructional Speech, 91 VA. L.
REV. 1973 (2005).
60
Volokh, supra note 60, at 983.
61
Id.
62
Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 581 U.S. 37, 47 (2017); Nat’l Inst. of Fam. and Life
Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373 (2018).
56
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located in New York. The physical location of the computers (more precisely,
the servers63) used to host the website may be elsewhere.
To take one example of a company offering hosting services, Amazon
Web Services (AWS) has servers throughout the United States (and the
world), corresponding to dozens of “availability zones.”64 Using servers that
are relatively near to the people accessing them has efficiency advantages.
This is one reason why music streaming service Spotify (which uses Google
Cloud65) has servers in multiple countries,66 as this facilitates more efficient
delivery of content to a geographically distributed user base. There can also
be country-level jurisdictional considerations that inform server location
choice. Amazon offers AWS GovCloud for customers that, for national
security reasons, need to maintain their data within the United States.67
Suffice it to say that server location is a complex topic involving an
essentially endless list of topologies and possibilities. For simplicity and
brevity, as noted above, this Essay assumes that a website is “located” at the
same place as the organization that runs it. 68 The subsequent discussion
generally assumes that a website located in an abortion-permissive state is
used to convey information about abortion services available in that state to
people in abortion-restrictive states, though other geographic configurations
are also briefly considered.
2. Bigelow and the Internet
Adjusted for half a century of technology advances, Bigelow is the case
most directly analogous to the present-day online provision of information
about out-of-state abortion laws and services. Notably, in concluding that
Virginia could not “bar a citizen of another State from disseminating
information about an activity that is legal in that State,” the Court
underscored the right of people in New York to convey information to
63

A server is a computer that sends information to a “client” computer in response to requests from
the client. See Server, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/technology/server [https://perma.cc/HH
G6-CME8]. A web server is a server that delivers web pages to computers that request those web pages.
64
AWS Global Infrastructure, AMAZON.COM, https://aws.amazon.com/about-awa/global-infrastruct
ructure/ [https://perma.cc/3S8K-XYZC].
65
Innovation at the Speed of Spotify, GOOGLE.COM, https://cloud.google.com/customers/featured/sp
otify [https://perma.cc/5DQZ-T5BE].
66
See, e.g., Jordan Novet, Spotify Said It’s Relying More on Google’s Cloud Even as the Companies
Compete in Music Streaming, CNBC (Feb. 28, 2018, 3:23 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/spotifyis-relying-googles-cloud-according-to-ipo-filing.html [https://perma.cc/B4YX-P28T].
67
AWS GovCloud (US), AMAZON.COM, https://aws.amazon.com/govcloud-us [http://perma.cc/B7Q
9-FB8Z].
68
Even this does not fully simplify matters, because there can also be ambiguity about the “location”
of an organization (e.g., an abortion rights advocacy group) that runs a website. The organization might
have offices in multiple states, or have no offices at all and be purely virtual, or be based outside the
United States. This Essay assumes that the organization will have an identifiable location.
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Virginians about lawful activities in New York.69 Bigelow and his newspaper
served to relay speech that people in New York had a First Amendment right
to convey—and state authorities in Virginia had no right to prevent
Virginians from receiving that information.
Mapped to the present era and the provision of online information from
an out-of-state location, the argument against censorship becomes even
stronger. In Bigelow, Virginia could easily identify a specific person in
Virginia (Bigelow) who was allegedly responsible for providing the
information in contravention of Virginia law. By contrast, consider what
happens today when a person in an abortion-restrictive state accesses a
website run by an entity in an abortion-permissive state. What party could
authorities in the abortion-restrictive state assert is unlawfully disseminating
information?
To attempt to avoid jurisdiction hurdles, the state could try to target the
local internet service provider (ISP) that a person in the abortion-restrictive
state uses to access the out-of-state website. But an ISP is just an
intermediary, and does not determine the content its customers choose to
access on the internet.70
Alternatively, the state might try to target persons at the organization
running the out-of-state website for knowingly conveying the information at
issue to people in the abortion-restrictive state.71 Attempts to assert control
over the information conveyed by people in a different state would not only
run counter to Bigelow, but would also raise important jurisdictional issues.72

69

Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S 809, 824–25 (1975).
It is nonetheless worth noting that in a different context, net neutrality, the Ninth Circuit in January
2022 declined to preliminarily enjoin California’s net neutrality law. See ACA Connects v. Bonta, 24
F.4th 1233 (9th Cir. 2022). The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s denial of a motion for a
preliminary injunction that would have barred enforcement of California’s net neutrality law. Id. at 1237.
This decision turned on the question of whether, in classifying broadband internet services as
“information services” rather than “telecommunications services,” the FCC had lost its authority to
preempt the California law. The Ninth Circuit wrote that “the FCC no longer has the authority to regulate
in the same manner that it had when these services were classified as telecommunications services. The
agency, therefore, cannot preempt state action, like SB-822, that protects net neutrality.” Id. (internal
citation omitted). See also Kim Lyons, Appeals Court Upholds California’s Net Neutrality Law, VERGE
(Jan. 28, 2022, 5:28 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2022/1/28/22906856/court-upholds-california-netneutrality-law [https://perma.cc/4Z94-F3SQ].
71
There are also other portions of the internet infrastructure that a state might attempt to target,
including web hosting services, domain name system servers, and so on.
72
In addition, to the extent that the speech at issue was commercial, Central Hudson would be a
consideration. Censorship opponents would point to the portion of the Central Hudson test stating “[f]or
commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading.” Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm. of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
Censorship proponents would emphasis the aspects of the test relating to “governmental interest.” See id.
at 563.
70
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Bigelow is a powerful precedent to protect the interstate flow of information
regarding abortion.
While the discussion above focuses mostly on the case where a website
is located in the same abortion-permissive state where the abortion services
it describes are available, other geographic configurations are also possible.
A website could be located in a third state that is neither where the services
it describes are offered nor in the abortion-restrictive state attempting to
impede information access. A website could be located in the abortionrestrictive state whose residents are visiting the website. A website could be
located abroad.73
These scenarios not only raise different jurisdictional issues, but in
relation to the First Amendment question they could lead to disputes
regarding what in Bigelow is dicta and what is holding.74 An opponent of
censorship could argue that the Bigelow Court clearly articulated a First
Amendment right for people in one state to receive information about “the
subject matter or the law of another State.”75 Under that interpretation, it does
not matter where in the United States the website is hosted, as its operators
have a right to inform people anywhere in the United States regarding
abortion laws in abortion-permissive states. A censorship proponent seeking
to classify that text as dicta might argue that any Bigelow holding regarding
interstate information access was narrower—i.e., that a state “may not, under
the guise of exercising internal police powers, bar a citizen of another State
from disseminating information about an activity that is legal in that State.”76
The narrower interpretation would place the three-state configuration—
e.g., a website in Illinois that provides information to people in an abortionrestrictive state about abortion services available in New York—outside the
scope of Bigelow. Or, the censorship proponent might argue that Bigelow’s
core holding had nothing to do with flow of information between states, but
rather was that commercial speech, when accompanied by additional

73

If the website is located outside the U.S., the question of who is operating the site becomes relevant,
and in particular whether or not they are U.S. persons.
74
Distinguishing between dicta and holding, and whether a binary classification is even appropriate,
has long been the subject of legal scholarship. See, e.g., Dictum Revisited, 4 STAN. L. REV. 509 (1952);
Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2005); and Andrew
Michaels, The Holding-Dictum Spectrum, 70 ARK. L. REV. 661 (2017).
75
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S 809, 822 (1975).
76
Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 824–25 (emphasis added). Bigelow was in Virginia, where abortion was
unlawful. Id. at 830–31. However, this sentence from the ruling is referring to the right of “a citizen of
another State” (i.e., New York) to disseminate information about an activity that was lawful in New York.
Id. at 824–25.
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information, merits First Amendment protection.77 This would also put the
three-state configuration outside the Bigelow holding. The same conclusion
would hold for a website hosted in the same abortion-restrictive state that is
trying to censor that information.
In addition to debating the dicta/holding issue in Bigelow, the
censorship opponent could point out that states where gambling is generally78
unlawful do not attempt to impede access to the websites of Las Vegas
casinos, 79 or to prohibit billboards and other forms advertising by those
casinos.80 In that context, it is a common and widely accepted practice for
states to avoid impeding the free flow of online information about activities
that are unlawful in-state but lawful in a different state.
3. Broadcasting: A Separate Domain
Finding little useful in Bigelow, proponents of censoring such
information may instead focus on Edge Broadcasting. They might argue that
under Edge Broadcasting, it does not violate the First Amendment for the
government to restrict speech that travels from one state to another when that
speech promotes activities that are lawful in only one of the states. Therefore,
they might conclude, without violating the First Amendment, a state
government can act to impede the online flow of information regarding
abortion services from websites in abortion-permissive states to people in
abortion-restrictive states.
There are multiple problems with this argument. As an initial matter,
Edge Broadcasting addressed broadcasting, a domain in which the
government has substantially greater power to regulate content than in other
domains. The classic case in this regard is Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, in

77
As noted earlier, the Bigelow Court wrote that “the fact that the particular advertisement in
[Bigelow’s] newspaper had commercial aspects or reflected the advertiser’s commercial interests did not
negate all First Amendment guarantees.” Id. at 818.
78
”Generally,” because there can be exceptions for state lotteries, and because a separate framework
applies to casinos operated by Native American tribes. See, e.g., Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L.
No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988).
79
See, e.g., the web pages describing the gambling available at the casinos at the Bellagio, BELLAGIO,
https://bellagio.mgmresorts.com/en/casino.html [https://perma.cc/R7DC-PL3N], and Caesars Palace,
CAESARS PALACE LAS VEGAS, https://www.caesars.com/caesars-palace/casino [https://perma.cc
/8PHL-L76C].
80
For another example, consider fireworks. Sellers located in states where fireworks are illegal
sometimes place billboards in nearby states where they are illegal. See, e.g., Alex Dalenberg, Firm
Defends Signs Touting Fireworks Deemed Illegal in AZ, ARIZ. DAILY STAR,
https://tucson.com/business/local/firm-defends-signs-touting-fireworks-deemed-illegal-inaz/article_e35c4def-9b29-5616-904f-8b8d68a351c4.html [https://perma.cc/NBL8-FFV3]; Even With
Billboards on I-91, Fireworks Are Still Illegal in Massachusetts, WWLP.COM (Jun. 27, 2019, 10:43 AM),
https://www.wwlp.com/news/massachusetts/even-with-billboards-on-i-91-fireworks-are-still-illegal-inmassachusetts/ [https://perma.cc/KZ23-J76G].
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which the Supreme Court held that the FCC’s now-repealed Fairness
Doctrine, which required that broadcasters give fair coverage to differing
viewpoints on public issues, did not violate the First Amendment. 81 The
weaker nature of First Amendment protections in broadcasting arises from
the government’s role in granting licenses to broadcasters, and to the related
fact that radio and television channels in the 20th century were a very limited
resource.82
This is further underscored by the contrast provided by Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 83 in which the Court in 1974 struck down as
unconstitutional a Florida statute mandating that newspapers allot space for
political candidates to reply to criticism levied at them by the newspaper.84
This outcome is notable given the analog between the Fairness Doctrine at
issue in Red Lion Broadcasting and the Florida statute addressed in
Tornillo.85 Both frameworks aimed to compel the owners of a platform for
disseminating information to host content that they might not otherwise
choose to host. Further, in both frameworks the government was attempting
to compel a platform to offer space for counterpoints.
Yet in Red Lion Broadcasting the Court wrote that “[t]here is nothing
in the First Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a
licensee to share his frequency with others and . . . to present those views
and voices which are representative of his community,”86 while in Tornillo
the Court concluded that “the Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of the
First Amendment because of its intrusion into the function of editors.”87 In

81
395 U.S. 367, 386–97 (1969). See also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 US 180, 195–206
(1997), upholding the constitutionality of “must-carry” laws requiring cable television providers to carry
a certain number of local stations.
82
As the Court wrote in Red Lion Broadcasting, “[i]t does not violate the First Amendment to treat
licensees given the privilege of using scarce radio frequencies as proxies for the entire community,
obligated to give suitable time and attention to matters of great public concern.” 395 U.S. at 394. Edge
Broadcasting does not explicitly mention scarcity, but it does refer multiple times to licensing, which is
made necessary specifically due to scarcity. See, e.g., 509 U.S. at 429 (“Although Edge was licensed to
serve the Elizabeth City area, it chose to broadcast from a more northerly position, which allowed its
signal to reach into the Hampton Roads, Virginia, metropolitan area.”).
83
418 U.S. 241 (1974).
84
In Tornillo the Court underscored a newspaper’s right to the “exercise of editorial control and
judgment,” concluding that “[i]t has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial
process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved
to this time.” Id. at 258.
85
The analog is close but not perfect. For instance, while Red Lion Broadcasting addressed speech
and press freedoms, see 395 U.S. at 375, Tornillo focused mostly (though not only) on press freedom, see
418 U.S. at 258.
86
Red Lion Broad., 395 U.S. at 389.
87
Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
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addition, Tornillo did not even cite Red Lion Broadcasting, which the Court
had decided only five years earlier.
This contrast illustrates the unique nature of First Amendment
jurisprudence in broadcasting, and supports an argument that Edge
Broadcasting is inapplicable (or at best, weakly applicable) in other domains,
including the internet. This argument is further bolstered by Reno v. ACLU,
which specifically drew a contrast between the scarce spectrum available to
traditional broadcasters and the internet, which “provides relatively
unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds.”88
Another problem with relying on Edge Broadcasting to justify
interstate censorship is that it involved information flow in the opposite
direction from what is at issue here. Under the fact pattern in Edge
Broadcasting, the federal government was able to prevent a radio station in
North Carolina from broadcasting information about an activity that was
unlawful in North Carolina, though lawful in Virginia. 89 States trying to
block the interstate flow of information regarding abortion would be doing
the reverse: they would be attempting to stop a speaker (i.e., an organization
in an abortion-permissive state that runs a website) from conveying
information to website visitors about activities that are lawful at the speaker’s
location. Edge Broadcasting simply didn’t address this fact pattern.
It is also worth noting that Edge Broadcasting addressed federal law,
and thus did not need to engage with the problems that would arise if a state
were to act to impede the interstate flow of information. The upshot is that
while Edge Broadcasting is the best precedent for advocates of internet
censorship of abortion information to cite, the pro-censorship arguments still
fall flat.
4. McCullen
In some respects, McCullen is less pertinent, as it did not consider
interstate communication or the internet. In addition, while a sidewalk is a
public forum in the legal sense, the internet is not,90 as private actors provide
the infrastructure for the internet and mediate access to it. But the internet is
nonetheless a space where the public can speak and hear others speak. Social
media companies can, subject to a narrow list of exceptions,91 make their
88

521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 428 (1993).
90
That said, a specific online space can be converted into a public forum through the manner in
which it is used by a government official. For example, in 2019 the Second Circuit held that President
Trump, through the manner in which he used his Twitter account, “created a public forum.” Knight First
Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 237 (2d Cir. 2019).
91
For instance, for sites that convey content provided by third parties, one exception is for content
that allegedly violates copyright. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (requiring that, upon receiving notification
89
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own decisions regarding what content to carry or prohibit.92 Thus, given that
under McCullen it was deemed unconstitutional for a state to close down a
public forum (the sidewalks93 near facilities where abortions were performed)
in order to restrict all expression, it would certainly be problematic for the
government to attempt to impose a content-based restriction regarding
information about abortion conveyed on privately owned social media
networks.94
5. Giboney and Speech Incident to Criminal Conduct
Interpretations of Giboney will be central to disputes regarding whether
the provision of online information regarding abortion is speech incident to
criminal (or civilly actionable) conduct. Consider again the Giboney Court’s
oft-cited95 holding that “it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom
of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the

as provided in § 512(c)(2), sites hosting third party content must “respond[] expeditiously to remove, or
disable access to” the allegedly copyright infringing material). Another series of exceptions is provided
in 47 U.S.C. § 230(e).
92
This assertion assumes that the largest social media companies cannot be regulated as common
carriers—an issue on which a circuit split has emerged between the Fifth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit.
In NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, 49 F.4th 439 (5th Cir. 2022), while the majority of the three-judge panel
stopped short of explicitly stating that the largest social media companies can be regulated as common
carriers, it nonetheless endorsed Texas’ right to enact a law that does so. The majority wrote that “we
reject the idea that corporations have a freewheeling First Amendment right to censor what people say”
(id. at 445) and that “the State can regulate conduct in a way that requires private entities to host, transmit,
or otherwise facilitate speech. Were it otherwise, no government could impose nondiscrimination
requirements on, say, telephone companies or shipping services” (id. at 455). In addition, the majority
quoted with approval a 2021 concurrence from Justice Thomas, writing that the largest social media
companies are “‘unlike newspapers’ in that they ‘hold themselves out as organizations that focus on
distributing the speech of the broader public’” (id. at 460 (quoting Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst.,
141 S. Ct. 1220, 1224 (2021) (Thomas, J., concurring))). By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit in NetChoice,
LLC v. Att’y Gen., Fla., 34 F.4th 1196 (11th Cir. 2022) wrote that “[i]n short, because social-media
platforms exercise—and have historically exercised—inherently expressive editorial judgment, they
aren’t common carriers. . . .” (id. at 1222).
93
Sidewalks are “quintessential public forums.” Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Educators’ Ass’n, 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983); see also Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939) (“The
privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on
national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be
exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and
good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.”).
94
If the content is purely advertising, without any accompanying information, the arguments become
more complex. An additional question would be how to apply the Central Hudson requirement that the
expression “at least must concern lawful activity,” Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm.
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980), given that the activity in question (abortion services) would be lawful
where the expression originated but unlawful where it was received.
95
A search on Lexis across all U.S. jurisdictions shows that this quotation appears in over two dozen
opinions since 2010.
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conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language,
either spoken, written, or printed.”96
This holding was quoted by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in 2014
in Commonwealth v. Johnson,97 a decision upholding the constitutionality of
the state’s criminal harassment statute. 98 It was also quoted by the North
Carolina Supreme Court in 2016 in State v. Bishop,99 a decision that struck
down as unconstitutional the state’s anti-cyberbullying statute. 100 These
divergent outcomes foreshadow what will likely be divergent court
interpretations of Giboney in response to disputes arising from state attempts
to censor access to online information regarding abortion.
Advocates of censoring online abortion information will point out that
there are many circumstances under which the government can target
expressive conduct without violating the First Amendment. For example, the
government criminalizes extortion 101 and the communication of criminal
threats.102 They will argue that the provision of online information regarding
out-of-state abortion services is aiding and abetting murder, 103 which is a
crime that the state has the highest interest in preventing. They will assert
that, just like the picketing in Giboney, the provision of online information
about abortion is not an isolated expressive act but rather a component of an
unlawful “integrated course of conduct,” 104 and that the government can
therefore proscribe it.
In response, censorship opponents will note that they are providing
information regarding abortion services that are lawful and not murder under
the law of the abortion-permissive states where those services are available.
They will also argue that providing information regarding abortion services
in abortion-permissive states is not speech incident to criminal conduct, but
is instead simply the provision of factual information about locally lawful
services—and thus a form of expression solidly within the zone of protected
expression. And, they will assert that it makes no sense to analogize
96

Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949).
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 470 Mass. 300, 309 (Mass. 2014).
98
Id. (“[T]he conduct in question was not protected speech, but rather a hybrid of conduct and speech
integral to the commission of a crime”).
99
State v. Bishop, 368 N.C. 869, 880 (N.C. 2016).
100
Id. (“[T]he statute [at issue] “violates the First Amendment’s guarantee of the freedom of
speech.”).
101
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 875(b).
102
See 18 U.S.C. §875(c); see also Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 738 (2015) (holding that
conviction under this statute requires consideration of mens rea, even though no specific mens rea
requirement is explicitly recited in the statute).
103
An additional case likely to be cited in this regard, at least in the Fourth Circuit, and probably
beyond, is Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
104
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949).
97
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providing online information about abortion to the picketing in Giboney. The
ecosystem for providing this information will be highly distributed, and thus
the opposite of the “integrated course of conduct” of the union’s actions in
Giboney.
It is difficult to predict how courts—and eventually the Supreme
Court—will respond to these sorts of arguments. The scope of the speech
integral to criminal conduct exception is unclear, and particularly so in
relation to how it might apply to interstate internet communications
containing content that one state deems criminal (or, with respect to civil
actions, tortious105) but another state does not.
6. The Dormant Commerce Clause
While free expression is the constitutional issue most directly
implicated by state attempts to censor access to online information about
abortion, it is not the only one. There is also the “dormant” Commerce
Clause (sometimes called the “negative” Commerce Clause106), under which,
as the Supreme Court explained in a 1970 decision, “[w]here [a state] statute
regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and
its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits.”107
It would be profoundly unhealthy for the online information ecosystem
to require website operators to create many different versions of webpages,
with each to be made available to users in only one or a few states. This
would involve not only the burden of creating a multiplicity of versions and
ensuring that geographically-appropriate versions were provided to internet
users, but would also involve the burden of tracking evolving state laws and

105

While Giboney addressed criminal liability, Volokh wrote that “Rumsfeld v. FAIR makes clear
that the Court views the exception as also applicable to speech integral to civilly actionable conduct.”
Volokh, supra note 66, at 983 n.1. Furthermore, at a time when even the scope of the First Amendment
exception for defamation is under renewed scrutiny, see, e.g., Andrew Chung, U.S. Justices Thomas,
Gorsuch Question Libel Protections for Media, REUTERS (July 2, 2021, 1:33 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-justices-thomas-gorsuch-question-libel-protections-media-202107-02/ [https://perma.cc/P35R-658Z], there will almost certainly be disputes regarding the role of the
First Amendment in determining whether the provision of information about out-of-state abortion
services is civilly actionable under the Texas and Oklahoma bounty laws discussed infra.
106
See, e.g., Ore. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994) (describing
“judicial scrutiny under the negative Commerce Clause”).
107
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v.
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)). In October 2022, the Supreme Court heard argument in Nat. Pork
Producers Council v. Ross, a case that may lead to further clarity regarding the dormant Commerce
Clause. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Wrestles with Case on Pigs, Cruelty and Commerce, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 11, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/11/us/supreme-court-pigs-animal-cruelty.htm
l [https://perma.cc/XJZ7-YJEM].
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updating website content accordingly. While initially this customization
might happen only in relation to information regarding abortion services,
once the infrastructure was created to implement it, there would be pressure
to apply it in other domains as well.
For example, states with strict firearm laws could attempt to restrict instate access to online information about firearms that are not lawful to
purchase in that state. In the aggregate, these changes would have farreaching impacts on the nature of the U.S. internet and its vital role in
expression. As Huq has observed,108 the resulting geographically determined
fragmentation of U.S. online discourse could result in substantive harms to
the economy. However, Goldsmith and Volokh make a federalism-based
argument regarding state internet regulation, writing that its constitutionality
should turn on “the extent to which web sites or other internet services can
determine, reliably and inexpensively, which states users are coming from,
so that the sites can then apply the proper state law to each user.”109
III. TECHNOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
While a state law purporting to require censorship of information about
out-of-state abortion services should be found unconstitutional, that finding
may take time. To block it from taking effect, the law’s opponents would
seek a preliminary injunction. As it is uncertain that they would be successful
in obtaining an injunction (and further, one that survives appellate and
potentially Supreme Court review), there is a need to engage with the
question of what would happen if the law were to go into effect. 110 The
bottom line is that censorship measures imposed by a U.S. state (or a group
of states), regardless of the mechanisms used, would be largely, but not
completely, ineffective. In exploring why, it is helpful to consider how
censorship might be implemented and the steps people would take to defeat
it.
A. Geographically Differentiated Content
Putting aside the legal questions, as a technical matter, could a website
deliver geographically differentiated content customized according to the
108

E‐mail from Aziz Huq, Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Prof. of L., Univ. of Chi. L. Sch., to
author (Aug. 9, 2022, 20:05 PDT) (on file with author).
109
Jack Goldsmith & Eugene Volokh, State Regulation of Online Behavior: The Dormant Commerce
Clause and Geolocation, 101 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2023) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=4142647.
110
An additional complication is that Supreme Court review of a preliminary injunction would likely
occur through the Court’s “shadow docket,” which, as Vladeck explains, is “the significant volume of
orders and summary decisions that the Court issues without full briefing and oral argument.” Steve
Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARV. L. REV. 123, 125 (2019).

106

20:87 (2022)

The First Amendment and Online Access to Information

U.S. state where a website visitor is located? With important caveats, yes.
Approximate location information is routinely collected and used by
websites in order to deliver location-customized services and advertising.111
It is also used at the level of countries in relation to copyright restrictions;
e.g., a website operator might make a video available to internet users in its
own country but not to internet users in other countries. This is termed
“geoblocking.”112
1. IP Geolocation
Whenever a device such as a laptop computer or smartphone connects
to the internet, it is associated with a public Internet Protocol (IP) address
that is sent to each visited website.113 Often, though not always,114 through a
process known as IP geolocation, the IP address can be used to infer the city
and state where the device is located. This is most easily explained using an
example.
Consider a person who connects a laptop computer to the WiFi hotspot
in a coffee shop in Dallas, and enters “nytimes.com” in the address bar at the
top of an internet browser. This will send a request to a New York Times
server, which will respond by sending the computer code representing the
home page of the New York Times to the laptop computer. The browser
running on the laptop will receive this code, process it, and display the
current home page on the screen. In order for this to occur, the New York
Times server must know where to send the information—in this example to
an IP address associated with the coffee shop’s network. The coffee shop’s

111
There are also important privacy considerations and related regulations that place limits on the use
of geolocation data. For instance, under the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and
the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), location data is considered personal data and is subject to
the associated data protection requirements. See, e.g., Personal Data Definitions: Comparing GDPR vs
CCPA vs CDPA vs CPA, WIREWHEEL (Oct. 7, 2021), https://wirewheel.io/blog/personal-data-dsarprivacy/ [https://perma.cc/B4LX-GX33].
112
See, e.g., Geoblocking, TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/32362/geoblocking
[https://perma.cc/W8HH-QYGW] (explaining that geoblocking “the process of limiting user access to
the internet based on their physical location”).
113
See, e.g., Eric Griffith, How to Find Your IP Address, PC MAG. (Mar. 7, 2021),
https://www.pcmag.com/how-to/how-to-find-your-ip-address [https://perma.cc/Y8HU-QTDZ]. The IP
address sent to a visited website is a public IP address, e.g., the address of a local network that a laptop
computer is connected to. The laptop computer itself will have a private IP address that it uses to
communicate within the local network, and that will not be externally visible. The discussion of IP
addresses herein refers to public IP addresses.
114
Because an ISP acts as an intermediary between a user and the internet, sometimes a local
network’s public IP address will geolocate to a city different from the city where the user’s computer
connected to that network is located. See generally How Accurate is IP-Based Geolocation Lookup?,
IPLOCATION.NET (Dec. 20, 2018) https://www.iplocation.net/geolocation-accuracy [https://perma.cc/4U
NQ-LLK4].
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router will then ensure that the information is relayed to the specific laptop
computer that sent the request.
Like physical postal addresses, IP addresses identify a destination to
which something should be conveyed. However, there is a key difference: A
postal address directly and publicly identifies a specific location such as a
home, apartment, or office suite. Anyone in possession of a postal address
can easily identify which building, and often which part of a building (e.g.,
a specific office suite or apartment) it corresponds to. By contrast, while
there are widely available tools115 that can be used to find the approximate
geographic location—such as a city and state—of an IP address seen by a
website server,116 associating that IP address with a more specific location
such as a particular residence, and then a particular device within that
residence, is difficult.117
The relationship between any particular laptop computer or smartphone
(or any other internet-connected device) and the public IP address associated
with that device as seen by the server hosting a website it is accessing can be
complex, as it typically involves the interaction among multiple networks. If
a laptop computer that accessed nytimes.com from a coffee shop WiFi
network is subsequently used to access nytimes.com from a home network,
the IP address presented to the New York Times server will change. This is
because the IP addresses seen by the servers that run websites are associated
with the local networks to which a laptop computer is connected rather than
being permanently tied to the laptop computer itself.
2. Defeating IP Geolocation
In addition to the approaches described above, websites can also be
accessed through mechanisms such as VPNs (Virtual Private Networks) and
Tor that mask user locations. VPNs render a user’s true IP address (and
therefore, approximate geographic location) invisible to a visited website,
replacing it instead with the IP address of a server that sits between the user
and the visited web site. It is common for VPNs to allow users to specify a
particular location (e.g., a country) where the user will appear to be located.

115
An example of an IP lookup tool is WHATISMYIPADDRESS, https://whatismyipaddress.com/iplookup [https://perma.cc/HN7E-GDNQ].
116
In addition to the “public” IP address that will be sent to a server for a website being visited, each
device accessing the internet also has a private IP address that is typically visible only within the local
network to which the device is connected.
117
Identifying a specific computer associated with a particular IP address is possible, but doing so
typically requires access to forensic information that is not publicly available, though it is accessible
through means such as a subpoena to an internet service provider issued pursuant to a criminal
investigation or civil legal proceeding.
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VPNs are centralized, meaning that the operator of the VPN has
knowledge both of the true IP address of the user, as well as of the IP address
of the website the user is visiting. Thus, although using a VPN allows a user
to access websites while appearing to be in a different state or country, it
leaves digital tracks that could later be examined and tie the user their
website visit history. In addition, VPNs generally (though not always) cost
money. This can be a disincentive not only economically, but because the
fact of having purchased a VPN just prior to seeking online information on
out-of-state abortion services can generate a record that the would-be VPN
user might wish not to create.
Users seeking a greater degree of obfuscation can turn to Tor, which is
a browser commonly used by privacy advocates. 118 Tor relays internet
communications through a series of computers that sit between the user’s
computer and the server for the website the user is visiting.119 When a person
using Tor accesses nytimes.com, the New York Times server will know only
the IP address of the last computer in this chain of intermediate nodes, i.e.,
the one the New York Times server is directly communicating with. Using
IP geolocation, the New York Times server could identify where that
computer is located, but that would merely be one node in a chain of nodes
that leads to the user’s computer, which would generally be in a different
location. The result is that the New York Times server would not obtain
information about the Tor user’s actual location. The decentralized nature of
Tor means that it is much harder to tie a particular internet user to the history
of websites they have visited using Tor. However, no mechanism for
accessing information online is completely anonymous.120
B. Why Censorship (Mostly) Won’t Work
It is instructive to run a thought experiment to see how things would
play out, in technological terms, if an abortion-restrictive state were to try to
compel website operators in abortion-permissive states to censor the content
delivered to persons in the abortion-restrictive state. First of all, many
website operators would simply refuse to comply, thereby quickly defeating
118
Aliya Chaudhry, How to Use the Tor Browser’s Tools to Protect Your Privacy, VERGE (Feb. 21,
2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/2/21/21138403/tor-privacy-tools-private-network-browser-settin
gs-security [https://perma.cc/4762-THUF].
119
Id.
120
See, e.g., Paul Ducklin, Tor and Anonymous Browsing – Just How Safe Is It?, NAKED SECURITY
(Aug. 13, 2020),
https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/08/13/tor-and-anonymous-browsing-just-how-safe-is-it/
[https://perma.cc/RB4T-ZE6S]. An uptick in Tor usage can serve as a signal to authorities that there are
internet users who wish to mask their activity. This could spur investigations aimed at uncovering the
identity of the users.
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this approach to censorship.121 In addition, many people would mirror the
relevant information on social media, quickly overwhelming any attempt at
control by a state government. (This assumes, of course, that the social media
companies themselves would not elect to censor this information based on
user location,122 and that Section 230 would block any attempts by a state
government to compel them to do so.123)
In a country like the United States with a robust ecosystem for the open
exchange of online information, there are so many ways for digital
information to get posted, re-posted, forwarded, screen-captured, etc., that
there is simply no technologically feasible way—to say nothing of the civil
liberties violations that would be involved—for a U.S. state to censor online
information that is easily and lawfully available outside that state.124 As a
result, interested persons in an abortion-restrictive state would generally
retain access to online information about out-of-state abortion laws and
services.
But, to pursue the thought experiment, suppose that a significant
number of operators of out-of-state websites providing online content
regarding abortion services were somehow compelled to implement
geoblocking, and were able to do so. Suppose further that the operators of
the websites were able to tackle the logistically onerous task of tracking the
latest abortion laws in every state, and to customize their content delivery
accordingly.
Very quickly, an ecosystem of VPN mobile phone apps and VPN
browser extensions would be widely publicized and adopted by some people
in abortion-restrictive states seeking access to abortion information from out121

A refusal by websites to engage in geoblocking would ensure the information on the website is
available to anyone visiting the website. It would not, however, provide visitors with anonymity.
122
This assumption may not hold. See, e.g., Katharine Trendacosta, Abortion Information is Coming
Down Across Social Media. What is Happening and What Next, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (July 28, 2022),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/07/abortion-information-coming-down-across-social-media-whathappening-and-what-next [https://perma.cc/LQ69-C23D].
123
Section 230, or more formally, 47 U.S.C. § 230, provides that “[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider,” § 230(c)(1), and that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be held liable” for content moderation decisions made in “good faith,” § 230(c)(2).
The statute contains an explicit exception for federal criminal law, § 230(e)(1), but not for state criminal
law. It also preempts state laws that are “inconsistent with” the statute, though does not define what that
means. § 230(e)(3). In addition to the statutory protections offered by Section 230, social media
companies have First Amendment rights.
124
It might be suggested that this logic is contradicted by the existence of a statute and the resulting
very active ecosystem, employed to compel social media companies (and other entities that host online
content) to take down content posted in alleged violation of copyright rights. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2020).
However, online copyright enforcement is only partially effective, and it occurs at a national, not state,
level.
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of-state websites.125 Using the location-spoofing126 capabilities of a VPN, a
person in an abortion-restrictive state would appear to a website as if they
were in an abortion-permissive state, rendering ineffective any geoblocking
performed by the site.127 Some users, aiming to reduce the likelihood of afterthe-fact reconstruction of their website visit history that is possible when
using a VPN, would instead turn to Tor.
However, not everyone seeking access to online information regarding
out-of-state abortion services would use a VPN or Tor, or would even be
aware that doing so is an option. In contrast with people in authoritarian
countries, people in the United States are not generally accustomed to the
need to circumvent government censors. Knowledge regarding censorship
circumvention approaches is not widespread among U.S. internet users. A
resident of an abortion-restrictive state seeking access to online out-of-state
abortion services information may not be in a position to quickly learn about
and install tools to allow them to access the internet while obfuscating their
location and identity. In addition, people in abortion-restrictive states who
are socio-economically disadvantaged would be less likely to receive
information that would help enable them to securely access online abortion
information provided by out-of-state websites. This inequity is yet another
reason why state-level internet censorship would be so concerning.
In sum, state authorities misguided enough to attempt to implement an
internet censorship regime would find themselves engaged in a game of
whack-a-mole. The information they were seeking to block would be quickly
replicated at far too many internet sites and social media sites for them to
block. Many internet users would find ways to circumvent censorship
measures. But while state censorship authorities would not win the whac-amole game, they would not completely lose. Their efforts, though ineffectual
in many respects, would nonetheless have some effect on reducing access to
online information about abortion services.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Essay has explored the legal and technological landscape that
would accompany state attempts to restrict access to online information
about out-of-state abortion services. Supreme Court precedent, particularly
125

See, e.g., Max Eddy & Kim Key, The Best iPhone VPNs for 2022, PC MAGAZINE,
https://www.pcmag.com/picks/the-best-iphone-vpns [https://perma.cc/V4BU-WMYR].
126
In this context, location-spoofing refers to presenting an IP address that indicates a different
location than where the user actually is. As a result, websites visited by the user do not know the user’s
true location.
127
VPNs provide a significant improvement in privacy and in terms of masking an internet user’s
location. However, because they are generally centralized, they do not provide anonymity. Internet users
wanting more anonymity often use Tor instead of VPNs.
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Bigelow, provides a strong basis to argue that such attempts would be
unconstitutional. That said, Dobbs itself undid longstanding precedent. It
would be naive to assume that the Supreme Court will necessarily hew to
precedent in adjudicating future First Amendment disputes regarding the
scope of state authority to regulate online access to abortion information.
Another important source of uncertainty is Giboney and the extent to
which courts will be sympathetic to claims by abortion-restrictive states that
the provision of online information about abortion is speech incident to
criminal conduct. In addition, while this Essay has focused on actions by
states, it is also possible that the federal government, either through
legislation or through agency actions, could attempt to impede provision of
or access to online information about abortion services. That would raise
many of the same First Amendment concerns discussed herein.
Constitutional violations aside, from a technological standpoint statelevel attempts to censor online information about out-of-state abortion
services would largely but not completely unsuccessful. The information
ecosystem in the United States is far too big, diverse, quickly evolving, and
distributed for any state (or a group of states) to effectively construct what
amounts to a digital wall around its residents. But even an ineffectively
constructed digital wall would still provide some degree of impediment to
the interstate flow of information about abortion services. The burden of that
impediment, and the enforcement actions against people seeking to
circumvent state-imposed internet censorship, would fall disproportionately
on the socio-economically disadvantaged. State-level censorship aimed at
preventing the interstate flow of online information about abortion services
would be unconstitutional, undemocratic, inequitable, and mostly ineffective.
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